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NON-NUCLEAR POWERS AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

A Study in Multilateral Arms Control

By Michael Tucker

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ACRONYMS

ABM	antiballistic missile
ASAT	anti-satellite
CBM	confidence building measure
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CD	Committee (since 1984, the Conference) on Disarmament
CDE	Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CFE	Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CPD	Comprehensive Program for Disarmament
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB	comprehensive test ban
CW	chemical weapon
ENDC	Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference
GSE	Group of scientific experts
INF	Intermediate range Nuclear Force
ISMA	International Satellite Monitoring Agency
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NNA	Neutral and Non-Aligned
NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
NTB	nuclear test ban
PTB	partial test ban
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SODD	See UNSSOD
UNSSOD	United Nations Special Session on Disarmament

PARTICIPANT NATIONS

WEST
Belgium (NATO)
Canada (NATO)
FRG (NATO)
Italy (NATO)
Netherlands (NATO)
France * (NATO)
United Kingdom * (NATO)
United States * (NATO)
. . .
Australia
Japan

EAST
Bulgaria (Warsaw Pact)
Czechoslovakia (Warsaw Pact)
GDR (Warsaw Pact)
Hungary (Warsaw Pact)
Poland (Warsaw Pact)
Romania (Warsaw Pact)
USSR * (Warsaw Pact)
. . .
China *
Mongolia

GROUP OF 21
Algeria
Argentina
Brazil
Burma
Cuba
Egypt
Ethiopia
India
Indonesia
Iran
Kenya
Mexico
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Zaire

* nuclear powers

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The recently signed Soviet-American intermediate nuclear force (INF) accord underscores the central role that must be played in the arms control field by the two nuclear superpowers. It is now also widely recognized that both arms control and superpower agreements in this area are critical to international stability and security. Less widely appreciated, however, is the increasing importance of other nuclear and non-nuclear states to the international arms control process.

Partly because of the trend toward a diffusion of military power and the widespread development of "dual purpose" civilian technologies with potential military applications, many issues on the current international arms control agenda cannot be effectively resolved by the two superpowers alone. What is needed is a broader recognition of the importance of multilateral and Soviet-American bilateral arms control efforts. Multilateralism is necessary for the negotiation of arms control accords which would impose constraints upon the military programmes of nuclear and non-nuclear states alike; yet multilateral arms control diplomacy cannot succeed without Soviet-American leadership and a willingness on their part can provide lesser states with an opportunity to help strengthen superpower interests in arms control.

These attributes of multilateral arms control, particularly as they relate to the diplomatic behaviour of non-nuclear states, are examined in this case study of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). The CD is the principal multilateral negotiating forum for a number of arms control issues which relate in very real ways to international security. Uppermost

among these on the Geneva agenda, and central to this study, are a chemical weapons convention, a refurbished outer space arms control regime, and a nuclear test ban accord. To date, however, the CD has yet to produce an arms control agreement. While the United States and the Soviet Union must be held chiefly responsible for this situation, other member states of the CD are not altogether blameless. Non-nuclear member states have pursued divergent "incrementalist," "idealist," and "revisionist" approaches toward the achievement of multilateral accords, and have hampered progress at Geneva because of their inability to arrive at a firm consensus on the fundamental aims of arms control.

Over the past decade, however, CD member states have come to recognize the contribution that multilateralism can make to the creation of arms control norms, as a precondition for the negotiation of durable agreements. A rudimentary consensus has also emerged within the CD with respect to certain norms — the relevance of arms control to nuclear deterrence and the importance of verification measures to arms control, for instance. Canada and other technically advanced non-nuclear states have played lead roles at Geneva in furthering a multilateral consensus over such norms.

INTRODUCTION

A central and enduring feature of contemporary international relations is the "adversarial partnership" between the United States and the Soviet Union.* Thrown into a situation of bipolar confrontation after World War II, these two states have developed and deployed military capabilities on a scale unparalleled in history. They are superpowers, with respect to both their global military presence and their destructive nuclear capabilities.

Their postures as nuclear adversaries did not cause the Cold War which emerged between them in the early post-1945 period, but those postures have over the past forty years exacerbated and heightened Soviet-American distrust. Yet, in the matter of their mutual interest in security and survival these two states have, during the past two decades or so, also groped their way toward a more stable military relationship. Arms control has been a chief instrument of this quest, promising quantitative and qualitative restraints on military/technological

* I wish to thank Geoffrey Pearson, John Toogood, Rychard Brûlé and other staff members at CIIPS, and Bernard Wood and other members of the Advisory Group of the North-South Institute's Middle Power Project, for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank the officials in the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs and the delegates to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament who responded to my many queries at various stages of this project. Dacre Cole of the Historical Section of the DEA and Malcolm Spaven of the Armament and Disarmament Information Unit at the University of Sussex kindly made research materials available to me. Research for this study was made possible through the financial assistance of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and the North-South Institute.

innovations designed to inspire greater confidence in the existing system of mutual deterrence.[1]

Clearly, the management of their global confrontation is a superpower responsibility, which stems in large measure from their near-duopolistic possession of nuclear arms. Equally clear is the breadth of this responsibility: it is not to the United States and the Soviet Union alone, but to the society of states at large whose members are vulnerable to the effects of a possible superpower military confrontation. Less clear, however, are the responsibilities which the "lesser" states in international society should share in the creation and maintenance of a more stable and secure international military order. It can appropriately be asked to what degree or in what ways these states should attempt to influence the substance and direction of superpower arms and arms control programmes.

This a diplomatic and military/strategic dilemma for lesser states. The dilemma stems of course from their vulnerability to an unbridled superpower strategic arms competition on the one hand and, on the other, from their limited ability to influence in both tangible and constructive ways Soviet and American arms control programmes. Consequently, the responsibilities of lesser states in the superpower arms control field are not clear cut. It must be recognized that lesser states, not privy to the delicate understandings which appear to have developed over time within the superpower strategic dialogue, may offer advice and urge courses of action that are not altogether beneficial to strategic stability.

What follows is a study in a largely unexplored field: the arms control diplomacy of non-nuclear lesser states, as willing but seldom welcomed

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[1] A recent and readable treatment of these themes is to be found in Coit Blacker, *Reluctant Warriors: The United States, the Soviet Union, and Arms Control*, New York: W.H.Freeman, 1987. The concept of "adversarial partnership" is discussed in Coral Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management*, London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

third parties to the Soviet-American bilateral dialogue.[2] Among lesser states a differentiation must be made at the outset of this study between the three "great" nuclear powers below the rank of the superpowers on the one hand, and the non-nuclear powers on the other. The nuclear great powers, Britain, France, and China, warrant and have received scholarly treatment elsewhere because of their unique military capabilities among the ranks of lesser states, and because logically they must at some point be drawn more closely into the field of nuclear arms control.[3] Theirs should then be the power of consent, while the powers of non-nuclear states will remain mainly advisory.

The setting for this study is the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). The successor to the 1969-1978 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), and its predecessor, the 1962-1968 Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC), the CD was established in 1978 by the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I). The CD is the only formal multilateral arms control negotiating forum whose membership includes, in addition to the five nuclear powers, important non-nuclear states from among the neutral and Third World non-aligned as well as the major Eastern and Western alliances.** The Geneva forum, thus, can be seen to represent the differing arms control perspectives and interests of the three major coalitions in international security relations. The CD is also the only

[2] See Nazur Kamal, *Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations in the United Nations*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University, 1986; Stephen B. Pullinger, *The Conference on Disarmament: Reasons for Failure*, unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Bradford, 1986.

[3] See, for instance, John Baylis et al., *Contemporary Strategy II: The Nuclear Powers*, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987.

** The Disarmament Commission of the United Nations is more truly multilateral than is the CD. In formal terms, however, the Disarmament Commission is a deliberative rather than a negotiating body. Other multilateral arms control negotiating bodies exist, namely the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) when it has mandated dialogues on Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, however, were confined to members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, while the CSCE is composed of Canada, the United States, and allied and neutral European nations.

formal diplomatic environment where non-nuclear states from within these three coalitions do have an opportunity to influence the negotiation of arms control measures which, were they to be agreed upon, would impinge directly upon Soviet and American military programmes.

Consequently, a symbiotic relationship has evolved between the CD exercise and the commitment of its non-nuclear members to arms control and to arms control multilateralism. Within the domestic polities of these states, CD membership has helped in varying degrees to strengthen political and bureaucratic support for arms control. It has also helped to legitimize the defence of arms control as a policy choice against competing and conflicting domestic interests, and it has eased the way for domestic expenditures on arms control research. Because of the limited diplomatic options open to them, of course, its non-nuclear members must exhibit a deeper commitment to the CD multilateral process than is necessary for the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet the Geneva environment, with all of its inherent limitations, has also circumscribed the opportunities for non-nuclear state diplomatic influence in important fields of arms control endeavour.

The CD is not a graveyard for arms control, as a former Soviet ambassador to the conference once described it. Its importance, however, is not widely appreciated, and begs a deeper analysis in this study. Its dilemmas are more widely recognized, and warrant a brief review here because of their profound implications for the arms control diplomacy of its non-nuclear state members.

The first of four stumbling blocks in the CD is the very nature of arms control itself. The years which followed the establishment of the CD in 1978 witnessed a dramatic heightening of international political tensions and, as a consequence, a partial paralysis of arms control diplomacy. While these political and diplomatic problems placed the practice of arms control at risk, the emergence by this time of potentially destabilizing military technologies and doctrines challenged the very foundations of arms control. Unquestionably, the most important arms control endeavour which was placed at risk was superpower bilateralism, a growing convergence of Soviet and American interests in

and understandings about arms control as a regulator of a stable system of mutual nuclear deterrence. But the Geneva CD could not remain impervious to the effects of the new cold war of the early 1980s. This widened a fissure which had opened in the late 1970s between non-nuclear Western members sympathetic to the military logic of superpower arms control arrangements and key members of the non-aligned group who were staunchly supportive of superpower nuclear disarmament.

Differences between its non-nuclear members over the meaning and proper aims of arms control did not alone account for the immobility of the CD in its formative years. A second difficulty, and equally long lasting, was the very challenge which the new Cold War posed to Soviet-American bilateralism. Since the establishment of the Geneva forum in 1962, its non- nuclear members have frequently been frustrated by the exclusivity of superpower bilateralism, and the marked indifference to multilateralism which the two superpowers have exhibited during their periods of détente and arms control collaboration. Yet these lesser states have been equally frustrated by the inability or refusal of the superpowers the collaborate, simply because they, the lesser states, have always depended in large measure upon the United States and the Soviet Union for leadership. The Geneva multilateral process has never been able to move at a swifter pace than the superpower bilateralists would allow.[4] The superpowers were engaged in meaningful arms control discussions during the late 1970s, but these dissipated with the Cold War tensions of the early 1980s. Neither Cold War nor détente was, it seems, salutary from the standpoint of CD work. Only very recently, in a period characterized by mixed détente and cold war, has the CD been able to take advantage of an apparent if limited willingness on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to engage the multilateral forum in their quest for arms control accords.

A third limitation inherent in the CD environment stems from the

[4] See Alan F. Neidle, "The Rise and Fall of Multilateral Arms Control: Choices for the United States," in Edward Luck, ed., *Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative*, New York: New York University Press, 1983.

nature of its negotiating process. The debates in the CD are predicated on the existence and the interplay of interests between three groups (in addition to China) which, as noted earlier, correspond to the major coalitions in international security issues: a Western group composed of member states from NATO, and Australia and Japan; an Eastern group composed of member states from the Warsaw Pact; and the Group of 21, comprising states from among the neutral and non-aligned. Julie Dahlitz has rightly observed that the "prevailing ethos" in the CD is predicated on the interests of these "power blocs," and has asserted further:

> Negotiating patterns reveal the presumption by each power block that any negotiating position acceptable to the others is likely to be disadvantageous to itself. Whatever sense there may be of common purpose, to escape the physical danger and economic and social burdens imposed by the nuclear arms race, appears to be outweighed by the presumption of implacable hostility. This could be the paramount reason why the rate of negotiation is so slow.[5]

It is certainly true to say that the arms control diplomacy of Western and Eastern non-nuclear powers must be understood in the final analysis within the contexts of their respective alliance relationships. Similarly, with the exception of Sweden as an anomalous westward leaning neutral state within the Group of 21, the diplomatic behaviour of the members of this group cannot be divorced from the disarmament and development aspirations of the non-aligned movement. It may be that the groups in the CD are better termed "diplomatic" rather than "power" blocs, because the element of "implacable hostility" and the concomitant quest for military advantage which was characteristic of the disarmament negotiations in the intense Cold War years has all but evaporated from contemporary multilateral discussions. But the United States and most certainly the Soviet Union, and perhaps also the leading states of the Group of 21, have continued to place a premium on group cohesion and have, on sensitive issues, treated divergent trends within alliance or group ranks as deviation or defection. And the element of gamesmanship, the quest for propaganda advantage which was characteristic of Cold War

[5] Julie Dahlitz, *Nuclear Arms Control*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983, pp. 32-46.

diplomacy, still remains. This has heightened the premium placed on group cohesion. Diplomatic positions must still be framed, perhaps more often than not, with a vigilant tactical eye on the tendency of adversarial blocs to exploit openings within group ranks.

As this study will show, it is a moot point whether defection from group ranks in the form of high-profile initiatives does much to engender more serious bilateral or multilateral arms control work. Group cohesion, as a constraint upon the more effective conduct of multilateral arms control diplomacy, is not without its paradox. There is something to be said for group cohesion as a means of softening the indifference of the superpowers toward the multilateral exercise. Indeed, one of the principal aims at Geneva of Western non-nuclear states has been to convince the United States that it should assume a greater responsibility for constructive leadership both within the Western group and within the CD at large. This effort has not been without success.

Perhaps more so now than at any time in the history of the Geneva forum, superpower involvement and leadership in multilateral arms control is crucial. Equally critical is the full and effective involvement of technologically advanced non-nuclear states. Scientific and technological innovations, and the diffusion of military and economic power in recent years, have meant, as Edward Luck has put it, "that few security problems can be handled successfully by the superpowers alone."[6] Nor can these be handled effectively by the CD in the absence of superpower leadership. Among these security problems must be included the sinister threat of the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. Concern over chemical weapons has intensified only in very recent years, largely as a consequence of their use in South-East Asia and in the Middle East, and as a consequence of developments in the field of "dual-purpose" civilian technologies with potential military applications. The development of such technologies encompasses the satellite and ballistic missile fields as well as those of the industrial and commercial use of chemicals. Because of the military side to these

[6] Edward C. Luck, "A Future for Multilateral Arms Control," in Luck, ed., *Arms Control, The Multilateral Alternative*, *op. cit.* p. 218.

programmes, the otherwise benign technological and economic development plans of advanced non-nuclear powers necessitate their increased and direct involvement in multilateral arms control efforts.[7]

As Thompson and Bissell note, however, multilateral arms control efforts remain "weak" with regard to issues "at the frontiers of military technology, particularly those that can be connected with the research and development programs of the 'civilian' sector."[8] This technological gap is the fourth of the basic difficulties which continue to confront the CD negotiations. The member states of the CD continue to grope toward the arms control elements of a common security framework. But their collective inability to understand fully the military implications of scientific and technological innovations must help to explain why these states have yet to reach agreement on any arms control accord. In addition to an ever-elusive comprehensive test ban treaty, a chemical weapons convention and a treaty on potentially destabilizing anti-satellite systems have for several years been uppermost on the CD agenda. As this study will show, the superpowers are principally but not exclusively to blame for the failure of the CD to reach agreement on these issues.

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[7] As Julie Dahlitz has claimed, "It is the technological climate that coerces mankind into coordinated activities." "ASAT and Related Weapons: prospects for the prevention of an arms race in outer space," *Arms Control: The Journal of Arms Control and Disarmament I* (August 1985), p. 182.

[8] W. Scott Thompson and Richard Bissell, "Toward a Strategic Conception of Arms Control," in Luck, p. 41. See also Jonathan Charney, "Technology and International Negotiations," *The American Journal of International Law* 73(1982), pp. 79ff.

THE PERIOD OF REFORMATION 1978-1980

In establishing the Committee (since 1984, the Conference) on Disarmament, UNSSOD I hoped to resuscitate the moribund Geneva multilateral forum. The superpowers at this time were meaningfully involved in bilateral arms control dialogues over a comprehensive test ban (CTB) and an anti-satellite (ASAT) accord, and showed no inclination to engage the services of the CD. In consequence, the UN Special Session abolished the Soviet-American co-chairmanship of the CD, which had been a Canadian initiative at the time of the establishment of the Geneva forum in 1962. UNSSOD also allowed for the expansion of the CD from thirty-two to forty members, and provided that both the procedural and substantive decisions would be made by consensus. With these changes UNSSOD hoped to strengthen an "organic" relationship between the United Nations and the Geneva forum.[9]

By strengthening the link between the UN and the CD, the neutral and non-aligned majority at UNSSOD hoped to make its centrepiece, a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament (CPD), the focal point for CD discussions.[10] In those heady days of idealism, Third World states in

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[9] Avi Beker, *Disarmament Without Order: The Politics of Disarmament at the United Nations*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985, pp. 48-53, 75-93; Michael Sullivan III, "Conference at the Crossroads: Future Prospects for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament," *International Organization* 29 (Spring 1975). For a bleak assessment of their fate see Inga Thorsson, "Multilateral Forums," in Arthur S. Lall, ed., *Multilateral Negotiations and Mediation*, New York: Pergamon, 1985.

[10] On the history and fate of the CPD, see Homer A. Jack, *Disarm or Die: The Second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament*, New York: World Conference on Religion & Peace, 1983.

particular saw the CPD as a practicable proposition which, through the implementation of the consensus principle and the mounting of political pressure by the Third World majority, could serve as a medium for exacting arms control concessions from the North. This majority had come increasingly to harbour strong doubts about the strategic logic of mutual nuclear deterrence and its arms control handmaiden, the SALT exercise, as instruments of military stability. As Louis René Beres put it tersely, "the objectives of SALT and the SSOD were far from congruent."[11]

Both the SSOD exercise and the reformations at Geneva were strongly resisted by the United States and the Soviet Union, who interpreted these exercises as untoward interference in their ongoing bilateral arms control dialogues. Both superpowers explicitly opposed the injection of nuclear disarmament discussions into the CD agenda, and there is no evidence that either gave serious consideration to the effect that the elimination of this class of weaponry would have on their security. To the extent that strategic doctrine and force posture informed the substance of the bilateral arms control dialogues, a principal aim of Soviet and American negotiators was the accommodation of existing and new weapons programmes which they felt would strengthen strategic stability. Wide-ranging prohibitions on stabilizing weapons and weapons systems were thus seen as inimical to the aims of strategic arms control. For the United States in particular, both the call for a CPD and the Geneva reforms increased its sense of isolation from the Third World UN majority and from arms control multilateralism. A historic superpower wariness of involving the Geneva forum in the bilateral arms control process was thereby heightened.

The post-UNSSOD I environment at Geneva also witnessed the emergence of rather fundamental differences between its non-nuclear members, about the existing international military order in general and about the strategy of nuclear deterrence as its central element. These differences were largely along Western and non-aligned group lines, and

[11] Louis René Beres, *Apocalypse - Nuclear Catastrophe and World Politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 211.

found expression in, at times, acerbic debates over the appropriate relationship between multilateral and bilateral approaches to arms control, between public and private diplomacy, and about the appropriate role of the non-nuclear powers at Geneva. The differing Western and non-aligned approaches to these strategic and diplomatic issues were very much in evidence in the early post-1978 period, and can usefully be described as the "incrementalist," the "idealist," and the "revisionist" approaches.

The "incrementalist" approach was, and remains, largely confined to the Western non-nuclear powers in the CD. It would confer upon the United States and the Soviet Union a primary responsibility for international security and order. It is in essence supportive of the strategy of mutual nuclear deterrence as the principal source of international stability, and looks toward verifiable arms control regimes as key instruments of the strategic balance. Incrementalism is by no means hostile to the disarmament ideal, but is unsupportive of multilateral attempts at imposing measures of nuclear disarmament upon the superpowers. Pragmatic and moderate in diplomatic style, and "technical" in their approach to step-wise arms control measures, the incrementalists see their principal role as catalysts and facilitators, and would thus accent the "pre-negotiation" and "ripening" functions of multilateral arms control dialogues. In this view, multilateralism is subordinate but complementary to superpower arms control bilateralism. Bilateralism is seen to have its own inner strategic and diplomatic logic but, depending upon the issue, is also seen as a necessary precondition for the success of multilateral diplomacy.

Both "idealism" and "revisionism" would in principle reject the incrementalist approach to arms control, and the notion of a stable bipolar nuclear balance upon which it is based. In their early years especially, the CD debates thus seemed to reflect what Platias and Rydell have termed a "diplomatic pas de deux between advocates of technical fixes and proponents of a restructured nuclear world order."[12] Idealists

[12] Athanassios G. Platias and R.S. Rydell, "International Security Regimes: the Case for a Balkan Nuclear-Free Zone," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds. *The Arms Race in the 1980s* London: Croom Helm, 1982, p. 277.

and revisionists would transform an international order based upon superpower hegemony in order to redress the stark imbalance in global economic and military power. If the incrementalist focus was, after 1978, principally East-West, the expressed concerns of the idealist and revisionist neutral and non-aligned states would remain perceptibly North-South. Unlike revisionism, however, "idealism" was at the outset markedly anti-nuclear and heroic in its quest for nuclear disarmament. It has never rejected out of hand the desirability of superpower agreements, but has exhibited a clear preference that these should be framed in United Nations and CD rather than Soviet-American terms. Bilateralism, then, should be subordinate to the multilateral arms control and disarmament process. To this end the idealists, unlike the moderate incrementalists, have been political activists and have assumed advocacy roles.

The minority "revisionist" trend has been more controversial, and more ambiguous in its aims, than either idealism or incrementalism. Its dislike and distrust of superpower nuclear hegemony and arms control bilateralism is still evident in the CD debates but, with a limited convergence of idealism and incrementalism after 1982, revisionism has become more isolated. In important respects, the position of non-nuclear pov ers within this typology can over time be suggested by the extent to which they have come to accept the precepts and *quid pro quos* of an admittedly discriminatory NPT. The attitude of the revisionists toward the existing non-proliferation regime would seem to signify an incipient preference for a multipolar nuclear order, failing nuclear arms control and disarmament. If incrementalism can be termed non-nuclear in disposition, and the idealists anti-nuclear, then revisionism represents a potential threshold or "near-nuclear" trend. It remains unclear whether revisionism has stemmed from a conception of a truly multipolar nuclear world order deemed to be more stable than the existing bipolar structure, or whether it has been governed by regional insecurities and aspirations. Both possible sources of revisionism continue to pose a significant challenge to the existing international order, and to superpower arms control orthodoxy.[13]

[13] Beker, pp. 44-53.

THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT 1980-1982

The period of retrenchment from the reformist ideals of the UNSSOD I period coincided with, and was in large measure instigated by, the new cold war in Soviet-American relations. The rather bleak atmosphere in the CD at this time was itself indicative of the fact that the multilateral environment could not escape the vicissitudes of superpower bilateral relations, much less become a part of a grand alternative to the existing global military order. The reformation of the CD and the demise of the co-chairmanship, heavy-handed though it had been at times in its treatment of the Geneva forum, did not confer upon the CD an autonomy from superpower arms control bilateralism.

The immediate and apparent cause of the new Cold War was the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Aside from the impetus given to Soviet and American military programmes, the principal effect of the post-Afghanistan chill in the East-West relationship was to be felt in the superpower arms control dialogues. The important Soviet-American discussions over an ASAT convention and a CTB accord were eventually adjourned, and the Carter administration in the United States removed from Senate consideration the ratification of the 1979 SALT II agreement. These developments clearly seemed to signify that the United States and the Soviet Union had no more interest in real progress in arms control than they had had during the intense Cold War years of the 1950s.

Yet, from the standpoint of both the bilateral and multilateral approaches to arms control, there were important differences between the two cold wars. First, not all of the dilemmas of arms control during the early 1980s could be attributed to Soviet-American political antagonisms. Cold war politics certainly exacerbated those dilemmas, but it must be remembered that the arms control agenda of the new cold war period comprised, in significant measure, the more intractable issues left unresolved by the arms controllers of the 1970s. The list included, inter alia, counterforce and theatre nuclear technologies, a CTB and CW convention, an ASAT accord, verifiable confidence-building measures (CBMs), an MBFR accord for central Europe, and a truly stable nuclear

non-proliferation regime. In short, the new cold war could not be fully blamed for what détente did not or could not achieve, and the impediments to arms control multilateralism could not be explained in terms of Soviet-American discord alone.

A second difference was the knowledge that it was possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to be partners as well as adversaries. There were those within the polities of the superpowers who were disposed to collaborate over arms control, and it is instructive to note that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted initially to "politicize" the debates in the CD, in the wake of the Afghanistan intervention. Both wanted to save the superpower bilateral relationship at Geneva, as an offshoot of an approach to arms control that had survived nearly twenty years of vicissitude.

Heightening international tensions, however, undermined this salutary superpower disposition. It seemed that by 1981 the new Reagan administration in Washington, indifferent to multilateralism, hostile to the Soviet Union, and in a "rearmament" mood brought on by a sharpened sense of vulnerability in the US strategic posture, had sealed the fate of arms control. This was not, however, totally true. Beginning in his important Berlin speech of June 1982, President Reagan proposed the strengthening of confidence-building measures in the Soviet-American relationship to include reciprocal exchanges of advance information about strategic and intermediate-range ballistic missile launches, the prior notification of major nuclear force exercises, and an expanded exchange of strategic force data.[14] The period of the early 1980s was not one of implacable superpower hostility toward arms control. It was a period in which, in light of the shortcomings of the arms control efforts of the SALT era, the United States and the Soviet Union were groping toward a new and sounder conception of arms control.

[14] Michael Tucker, "Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control," in R.B. Byers, ed. *Nuclear Strategy and the Superpowers*, Toronto: The Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984. Ken Booth, "Disarmament and Arms Control," in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts*, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987, p. 161.

From the standpoint of both the bilateral and multilateral arms control processes, the principal impediment to progress at this time was not Soviet-American militarization per se; it was, rather, the lack of overall coordination within the arms control decision processes of the two major powers and a linked trend toward the political ascendancy of the conservative foes of arms control. As the American ambassador to the CD candidly stated in 1981:

> It will not have escaped the notice of members of the Committee that the United States delegation has been relatively silent during our 1981 session. Apart from my April 7 intervention and a recent brief discussion of chemical weapons last month, my delegation has spoken only when spoken to — that is, when it has been necessary to put our position on record. We have thought this to be an appropriate posture, given the fact that the review of United States arms control policy is still continuing.[15]

Western non-nuclear powers feared this trend in American behaviour: the USA, seemingly hors de combat in the Geneva negotiations and disposed toward isolationism. None of them was, however, prepared to step into the vacuum in Western leadership left by the United States. Their arms control energies had been momentarily deflected from CD endeavors toward the creation of a European intermediate range nuclear force (INF) arms control accord. Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands did attempt to exert gentle pressure on the United States to be more flexible on the establishment of working groups in the CD. Their principal concern was not, however, to achieve rapid agreement over issues high on the CD agenda; it was to give the multilateral forum the semblance of viability as a negotiating process. It was also to offset the public relations advantage which the East was reaping, if momentarily, as a consequence of apparent American obstructionism.[16]

The issues which were uppermost on the CD agenda at that time were nuclear disarmament and a CTB. The East had seized the initiative in

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[15] Geneva, Conference on Disarmament, Verbatim Record 146 (Hereafter CD/PV).

[16] Interviews, February, 1986.

supporting neutral and non-aligned proposals that working groups with negotiating mandates should be established for these issues, an idea which the United States would not countenance. There was consequently an inherent asymmetry to the CD debates, which placed a premium on Western group cohesion. The mandate issue, and Soviet support for the postures of the Group of 21, however, veiled from CD view the extent to which the United States and the Soviet Union were fundamentally at one over matters nuclear. This still remained true for the strategy of nuclear deterrence, and it would always remain true for the existing non-proliferation regime. As Alan Neidle has observed, "the NPT remains the most important and far-reaching project embodying the mutual interests of the two countries in the field of multilateral arms control."[17] Indeed, their concern for the NPT regime binds the two superpowers to multilateral arms control. Yet it was this issue, especially in the wake of the failure of the 1980 NPT Review Conference to conclude on their terms, which most exercised the Group of 21, and which made them all the more determined to focus in the CD on nuclear disarmament and a CTB. Under the vigorous leadership of four NPT-holdouts, a rather unholy alliance between Argentina, Brazil, India and Pakistan, the Group of 21 demanded that the superpowers move ahead in these arms control fields to signal their commitment to do so under the terms of the NPT.

Yet the NPT remains the most important arms control instrument in effect for technologically advanced Western non-nuclear states such as Canada and Australia. As purveyors of peaceful nuclear equipment and technology, or as exporters of uranium, they have a clear stake in a stable non-proliferation regime. And, since the entry into force of the NPT in 1970, they have contributed significantly to the strengthening of the international non-proliferation safeguards regime.[18] With the Netherlands and Sweden at the 1980 NPT Review Conference, Canada and Australia were in the vanguard of the participants at that conference in calling for universal subscription to full-scope safeguards. Accordingly,

[17] Neidle, p. 12.

[18] See Michael Tucker. *Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes*, Scarborough, Ont.: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980.

the central thrust of their CD diplomacy was at this time directed toward undermining the arms control arguments of revisionist non-aligned members.[19] In order to achieve this, however, leadership and movement were needed on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union. Failing this, the moderate Western powers feared the emergence of two trends in the arms control field: a progressive tendency on the part of the superpowers toward bilateralism, and the dominance of the non-aligned, led by the revisionist powers, over United Nations-linked arms control forums and processes. From the standpoint of Western interests and aims, neither of these would have been salutary.

Thus a host of related but distinct challenges confronted Western non-nuclear states in the CD at this time: the palpable threat posed by the new cold war between the two superpowers, the paralysis and the overt politicization of the CD as a negotiating forum, the public relations edge which had been achieved by the East, and the challenge by revisionist non-aligned states to the existing strategic order. These all pointed in an immediate and longer-term sense to the need for renewed and constructive American leadership within the CD. To this end, Western group cohesion was both necessary and desirable, and thus Western non-nuclear states concerted their efforts toward achieving this cohesion through the coordination of Western policies and positions. This cohesion was seen as one of principal national security interests which these states had in the CD exercise, and the quest for it provided an object lesson in coalition diplomacy akin to that given by the allied Western non-nuclear powers in other multilateral forums such as the MBFR.[20] The assumption was also made, in some measure correctly, that if the CD was to have an impact upon the arms control policy process in the United States, the principal medium would be Western group cohesion as a means of strengthening the political hand of American negotiators.[21]

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[19] See the debate between Canada and India. CD/PV 139, CD/PV 144. See also Beker, pp. 86ff.

[20] Gregory Treverton, "Managing the Alliance Politics of Multilateral Arms Control," in Luck, p. 78. On coalition diplomacy see Jonathan Dean, "East-West Arms Control Negotiations: The Multilateral Dimension," in Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, eds. *A Game for High Stakes: Lessons Learned From Negotiating with the Soviet Union*, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger 1986.

[21] Charles Maynes, "U.N. Disarmament Efforts: Is There Life After the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament," in Luck, p. 58.

When Western group concerns were expressed in Washington, the United States moved in early 1982 to support the establishment in the CD of CTB and CW working groups.

THE PERIOD OF EVOLUTION 1982-1986

During this period the CD edged away from politicized debates toward its negotiating role. Increasingly, however, and in a useful fashion, it took on the functions of a deliberative body. The underlying reason for this change in the overall atmosphere of the Geneva forum lay in the external environment, in the fitful but perceptible shift in Soviet-American relations from a posture of antagonism and distrust toward an adversarial partnership mildly reminiscent of their détente era. A disposition toward bilateral agreement on arms control measures emerged, signalled by President Reagan's 1982 Berlin speech, the subsequent modernizing of the Soviet-American hotline, and the initiation of dialogues over strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces. These provided the chief medium for the expression of mutual superpower interests in renewing their limited process of accommodation.

Arms control multilateralism became a principal beneficiary of movement in the bilateral sphere. New proposals were put forward to sustain the diplomatic life of the long stalemated Vienna MBFR talks; a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) was established in Stockholm in 1984, to reach agreement by late 1986 on militarily significant CBMs; and the CD was to witness the establishment, in August 1983, of a CW working group with a negotiating mandate and, in March 1986, of an outer-space working group with an exploratory mandate. These latter measures, and the establishment of the CW group in particular, signified that the CD did have the potential to negotiate arms control measures. Perhaps the principal accomplishment of the CD in this period was its facilitation of an evolution in the strategic and arms control thinking of a number of its non-nuclear power members, principally but not exclusively from within the Group of 21. As the West German delegate observed in 1986, the idea at UNSSOD I "that nuclear disarmament could be achieved over the heads of the nuclear powers has been increasingly receding, and a new and more sober approach has

taken its place. Not all delegations may agree; but to me the tendency is clear."[22]

The 1982 second UN Special Session on Disarmament reflected and helped to nurture these changing attitudes and perceptions. As Charles Maynes has noted, there was a different temper to the two SSOD exercises; UNSSOD II was neither as perceptibly anti-American nor anti-superpower as its predecessor.[23] While the Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament remained the centrepiece of the second special session, the member states were not as committed to it as they had been in 1978. If UNSSOD I was North-South in the substance of its debates, between a satisfied, technologically advanced and militarily dominant North and a dissatisfied, underdeveloped and militarily weaker South, then UNSSOD II was East-West in its focus on the military/strategic problems of the Cold War alliance systems. From these debates emerged a more universal if rudimentary understanding about the necessity for a stable balance of nuclear power in the East-West relationship. Accordingly, UNSSOD II reflected a growing appreciation on the part of its member states for the logic of arms control as a stabilizing measure for mutual nuclear deterrence.

UNSSOD II, of course, was held in a political, military, technological and arms control environment markedly different from that of its predecessor. The shifting temper of many non-aligned states at the second Special Session, and subsequently in the CD, can be explained in terms of this environment — its relevance to their heightened sense of military/technological vulnerability, and their changing perceptions on the roots of insecurity. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the deployment of the SS-20 in Asia, and the Polish crisis of the early 1980s eventually moderated a Third World disposition toward anti-Western and explicitly anti-American rhetoric in the CD.[24] But the Geneva

[22] CD/PV. 383. See also Beker, pp. 59ff.

[23] Maynes, p. 53. See also Michael Tucker, "Canada and UNSSOD II," in R.B. Byers, ed. *Arms Limitations and the United Nations*, Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982.

[24] CD/PV. 158 (Sweden).

debates reflected a growing recognition within the Group of 21 that many Third World security problems had their roots in indigenous territorial and irredentist claims rather than in superpower rivalries or hegemonic ambitions.

In the CD, as at UNSSOD II, Third World states held fast to their long-standing inhibitions about bringing regional security problems to the fore in multilateral arms control discussions. Yet, as Edward Luck observed, in the post-UNSSOD II environment of the CD "deep fissures" began to open within the Group of 21 on arms control issues.[25] The anti-NPT stalwarts were divided, not only from increasingly moderate neutral and non-aligned members led by Sweden and Egypt (which ratified the NPT in 1980), but among themselves. They no longer formed the core of an anti-superpower, anti-nuclear movement. By 1983 important distinctions could be drawn from the CD plenary debates between the expressed attitudes of India and to a lesser extent Pakistan, on the one hand, and Brazil and Argentina on the other, about the discriminatory nature of the NPT and the superpower near-duopoly of nuclear weapons which the treaty helped to preserve.

None of these threshold states signaled a disposition to change their policy stands on the NPT and disavow the nuclear option. In concert with more moderate members of the Group of 21, however, Brazil and Argentina expressed a limited sympathy for the military logic of Soviet-American system of mutual nuclear deterrence. The chief impulse behind this shift in perception and attitude was not the incipient threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to strategic stability; it was a growing Soviet and American military/technological interest in strategic defences against ballistic missiles and satellite monitoring capabilities. These were areas of civilian and potential military interest to technologically-advanced Third World countries. Thus, by 1986 even Pakistan conceded to the CD that "we are no admirers of the concept of strategic deterrence. We are, however, gravely concerned at the attempts

[25] Luck, "A Future for Multilateral Arms Control," p. 218. See also Michael J. Brenner, "Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Regime: A Multinational Approach," in Luck ed., *Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative*.

to replace this concept with an even more dangerous one."[26]

For the Western non-nuclear powers, who were themselves doubtful about the spectre of strategic defences, the shifting strategic perceptions and diplomatic alignments within the Group of 21 were on the whole salutary developments. At a very informal level new allies were to be found among the more moderate neutral and non-aligned countries (NNA). These states moved toward the incrementalist arms control approach, focussing more on practicable regimes for chemical weapons and rather than comprehensive bans and nuclear disarmament schemes. In light of the verification and compliance dilemmas afflicting the superpower arms control relationship, a very small number of Third World states began to subscribe to the Western "technical" approach to arms control. A shared aim of the Western states and these Third World moderates was to catalyze superpower agreement through the CD, by strengthening the technical bases for adequate verification measures.

This limited convergence of Western and moderate NNA arms control approaches would suggest that the Geneva forum has done its best work to date in the pre-negotiation sphere. The work of the CD in this sense can best be understood as an important part of a broader international arms control process: the creation of norms or understandings between states with respect to the importance of verification, and the military/strategic logic of stabilizing arms control measures. The "norm creation" role of the CD is to be distinguished from its negotiating or "regime creation" role which, while it has undergone a renaissance of late, remains problematic for the Geneva body because of the intractability of the issues on its negotiating agenda.[27] Yet it is questionable whether the CD, in its urgent quest for successes on the treaty or regime creation front, can rest content for the near future with a less visible norm creation role. It is also questionable whether the CD, in pursuing this latter role, has had a serious impact upon the strategic and policy-making environments which lie beyond Geneva.

[26] CD/PV. 337.

[27] On the norm creation role of the CD see Dahlitz, *Nuclear Arms Control*, pp. 44-73, and Robert Carocciolo, "Main Issues in the Disarmament Negotiations," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds. *The Dynamics of the Arms Race*, London: Halstead Press, 1975, p. 274. On the concept of regime creation see Platias and Rydell, "International Security Regimes," p. 273.

THE CD AS A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

The Geneva plenaries have been likened to an international seminar on nuclear strategy and international peace and security.[28] The "seminar" ambience of the CD, at times acerbic, has detracted from its aura of businesslike discussion and from its sense of urgency. Yet to underestimate the value of the CD as a strategic dialogue is to underrate its intelligence gathering function. It is also to undervalue the extent to which its open debates have raised the level of both East-West and North-South understandings about the complexities, ambiguities, and importance to stability and international security of the strategy of nuclear deterrence. In a seminal statement on the CD as a strategic dialogue, the West German delegate noted that "the Conference bears a Janus face; it is a negotiating and dialogue organ at the same time, the two being inextricably linked... It would be wise for us to acknowledge this double-faced nature of the Conference more clearly and to exploit its dialogue potential more fully."[29]

Non-nuclear powers have had useful, if at times oblique, roles to play in this multilateral variation on the superpower strategic dialogue. They have on occasion evoked responses from superpower delegates which

[28] See Miljan Komatina, "Implications for the United Nations," in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations* IX (Summer 1986), pp. 124-125. See also Serqui Verona, "The Geneva Disarmament Negotiations as a Learning Process," *Arms Control: The Journal of Arms Control and Disarmament* 1 (May 1980).

[29] CD/PV. 383

have signalled their understanding of strategic doctrines but which, for reasons of domestic politics, they could not explicitly recognize as policy in their bilateral dialogues. This role was played at an informal level by Canada and Poland in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) during the 1960s, when the Conference was attempting to grapple with the conceptual relationship between nuclear disarmament and the nuclear balance of power.[30] In response to probes by Canada and other Western non-nuclear powers as to what was meant by the concept of "balance," the Soviet delegate would frequently employ the concept of mutual nuclear deterrence in argument but in formal statements deny its relevance. As Serqui Verona has further observed, the Western states, in the protracted and esoteric debates over nuclear force reductions and the quest for mutual East-West postures of "minimum deterrence," were "not so much interested in the negotiation of details as in attempting to come to grips with the nature of Soviet strategic doctrine and its interrelationship with the size and deployment of Soviet nuclear forces."[31]

In the CD during the mid-1980s, West Germany appears to have played an important role in pointing out the gaps in Soviet strategic doctrine, and used the CD debates to alert the superpowers to the possible untoward implications of their arms control proposals for alliance security. In a debate in the CD during 1986 on the November 1985 Soviet-American summit commitment to limit and reduce superpower strategic arsenals, the Soviet delegate queried the role of the multilateral forum in the nuclear disarmament process. West Germany concurred that the primary responsibility for this rested with the nuclear weapon states, but warned that "the security of states is indivisible. The security of nuclear weapon states is a mix of nuclear and conventional components, and they are particularly sensitive to the fact that one of these components cannot be artificially extracted without having consequences for the other."[32] This could well be interpreted as an oblique signal to Washington as well as Moscow about NATO

[30] Verona, p. 109.
[31] Ibid., p. 108.
[32] CD/PV. 359

European concerns regarding the integrity of the American nuclear guarantee to the alliance, in view of the perceived Soviet conventional preponderance in the central European theatre.

Again, in what could be interpreted as a veiled signal to the United States regarding alliance worries about the implications of Soviet and American strategic defences for NATO security, the Federal Republic suggested that the CD could examine how the dynamics of technology could influence the future role of nuclear weapons and strategic stability. This point was cast in terms of a particular gap in the work of the CD as a strategic dialogue, that the role and significance of nuclear weapons in the security relationships between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states had not been adequately discussed in the multilateral forum.[33]

The ENDC environment of the 1960s helped in shaping an understanding between East and West that they both appreciated the logic of mutual nuclear deterrence. Similarly the CD environment of the 1980s, as intimated earlier, has played a role in helping to bridge the gap between a Northern perspective on arms control as an instrument of strategic deterrence and stability and a Southern perspective on arms control as an alternative to the balance of power and as a first step toward nuclear disarmament. Both Western and non-aligned states seized upon the Soviet-American Joint Statement of 8 January 1986 to accent the stated interests of the superpowers in strategic stability and arms control and their shared belief that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.[34] While a number of non-aligned powers have come to appreciate the strategic dilemmas of the East-West security relationship, it cannot be said that this process of communication has been truly reciprocal. There remains a gap in the strategic dialogue of the CD, to which West Germany alluded, namely the need on the part of Northern states to gain a deeper understanding of Third World security concerns.[35]

[33] Ibid.

[34] See the statements by Yugoslavia CD/PV. 347, Venezuela CD/PV. 361, West Germany CD/PV. 382, and Sweden CD/PV. 383.

[35] CD/PV. 387.

THE CD AS AN ARMS CONTROL COMMUNITY

The role of the Geneva Conference as a "community," creating among its participants a deeper understanding of the need for arms control in international relations, is as crucial to the norm creation function of arms control multilateralism as is the strategic dialogue. As an arms control community, the CD is neither to be embraced nor rejected. As with the strategic dialogue role, the potential is there, but it is not yet fully realized. Member states have yet to agree on what form of arms control is more likely to enhance international stability, either as an adjunct or an alternative to the balance of power. More fundamentally, CD member states have yet to agree fully that arms control, however conceived, is a rational alternative to unbridled armaments programmes.

An observer of the CCD judged in the mid-1970s that the Geneva forum embodied "a sense of community among the small corps of diplomats skilled in the technical aspects of arms control negotiations."[36] This observation was as perceptive as it was premature. Beyond the less than hospitable environment for norm creation of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the CD remains the only formal international organization which provides an ongoing medium for the representatives of greater and smaller countries alike to communicate on arms control issues. So far this has been the most important aspect of CD work, as an embryonic arms control community. It has provided an opportunity, if not fully exploited, for interdisciplinary collaboration of a transnational kind between diplomats, scientists, and lawyers aimed at strengthening the technical and legal sides to their diplomatic work.

The recent shift to a technical arms control approach on the part of moderate Group of 21 CD members can be seen, as Hedley Bull has argued, as part of a broader trend in the Third World toward a "more scientific and secular outlook."[37] But it must also be seen as an offshoot of the CD experience. The Geneva forum can also generate or strengthen

[36] Sullivan, p. 394.

[37] Hedley Bull, "The Revolt of the West," in M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly, eds. *Great Power Relations, World Order and the Third World*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1981, p.204.

the commitments of states to arms control regimes, particularly with respect to verification measures. Work at the Geneva ENDC/CCD helped non-aligned and Western non-nuclear states overcome their reservations about NPT safeguard provisions. More recent work on the part of these states in the CCD/CD Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has drawn them toward supporting advances in seismic detection techniques to help verify a CTB; and it may well be that the CD has been instrumental in strengthening Soviet moves toward acceptance in principle of on-site inspection provisions.[38]

The Pedagogical Function of the CD

The pedagogical function of the CD is an offshoot of its incipient roles as a strategic dialogue and as an arms control community. This function has been most evident in the verification field, where the CD has helped to strengthen an emerging international consensus that adequate measures for verification and compliance must form an essential element in all arms control agreements. It is no longer conventional wisdom among non-Western states in the CD that "political will" alone is the principal prerequisite for arms control, important as political will is. It is also no longer conventional wisdom in the CD that the "failure" of arms control to materialize can be attributed more or less exclusively to the absence of political will, particularly on the part of the major nuclear powers.

There is growing recognition in the CD that a number of major arms control issues or agreements remain problematic because of verification difficulties. Included here would be strategic arms limitations, the ABM treaty, the non-proliferation regime, and the as yet unresolved multilateral quests for ASAT, CW and CTB conventions. The emergence of potentially destabilizing new military technologies, and the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have brought home to a majority of CD states the need for effective verification

[38] CD/599. See also John Keegan, "Chemical Arms Ban Working," *Daily Telegraph*, June 5, 1986; William Dullforce, *The Financial Times*, July 10, 1986. On the influence of the CD on Soviet on-site inspection approaches, see Neidle, p. 23.

measures if arms control conventions in these fields are to hold and not breed distrust. As the delegate from Pakistan recently advised the CD, with regard to a CW convention:

> An important consideration, particularly for non-aligned countries, is the question of confidence in the observation of the CW convention. In our view, a case of breach of the convention must cause serious concern to the entire international community. Verification must, therefore, remain a key issue until it is resolved to our mutual satisfaction.[39]

Clearly, the crux of the difficulties surrounding verification procedures does not lie solely with the absence of adequate techniques to deter or detect evasion; it also lies with the political or military acceptability of such measures. Yet the challenge for more effective verification procedures exists, and this has been strengthened in recent years by reciprocal superpower charges of non-compliance with existing strategic arms accords. Regardless of the motives behind or indeed the legitimacy of these charges, they have been made in the form of technical assessments and must be met on technical grounds.

At Geneva, the Western non-nuclear powers and Sweden have inspired more serious thinking about verification measures through working or "conceptual" papers on the subject. Exemplary in this regard was the 1986 Canadian working paper, "Verification in all its Aspects," which was prepared in response to a request by the U.N. Secretary-General that February for national viewpoints on the subject. It represented the culmination of Canadian thinking about verification, dating back to 1981. Canadian and Dutch working papers that year gave these states lead roles in the CD in the development of a generic conceptual approach to verification, and in stimulating a recognition at Geneva about the need for a more institutionalized and longer-term approach to verification problems and prospects.[40] More moderate Third World States have been the principal, but not the only, beneficiaries of such Western efforts. Non-nuclear states as a whole have

[39] CD/167; CD/203.

[40] Interviews, September, 1986.

come to recognize that if they are to have any impact at all upon the international arms control process, this will come about as a consequence of the technical advice they have to offer, especially in the verification field.[41]

The importance of verification is not all that CD member states have come to appreciate. The Western non-nuclear powers and Sweden have presented many working papers to the CD on a spectrum of issues and these have, on balance, been warmly received. It was widely felt, for instance, that the 1982 Canadian working paper on arms control and outer space had stimulated thinking in CD circles about a subject — the ASAT challenge — which had until then been given remarkably little attention in the multilateral forum.[42] Yet it has been the experience with verification work which has best shown the pedagogical value of the CD. Much has been learned by CD members about the value of verification through the seismic experts' group and through the chemical weapons working group. Indeed, had the Geneva forum been given a greater technical role to play in the Soviet-American bilateral dialogues over a CTB, it might well have had a better appreciation of the range of objections raised by the United States to the negotiability of a test ban.[43]

THE CD AS A BILATERAL AGENCY

The superpowers have used the Geneva multilateral forum for informal bilateral talks, although the precise relationship between this channel of communication and the formal Soviet-American bilateral process is not publicly known. It does appear that superpower use of the CD as a "bilateral agency" has been prevalent during periods of sharpened tension, when their more formal channels have been in abeyance or disarray. The value of the CD in this respect was suggested when, in the early 1980s, Soviet and American delegates to the multilateral conference tried to avoid any linking of their work with troublesome political issues. In 1982 the United States and the Soviet

[41] CD/PV. 365. See also Hella Pick, *The Guardian*, July 16, 1986.

[42] CD/320, August 26, 1982.

[43] Dahlitz, *Nuclear Arms Control*, p. 52.

Union displayed an interest in taking issues to the CD (and the ASAT issue in particular) which were stalled in the bilaterals. And during 1983 and 1984, when most East-West arms control dialogues had reached a hiatus, the CD, and the superpowers therein, continued their work.[44]

These trends would suggest that the role of the CD as an informal instrument of bilateralism has not diminished significantly as a consequence of the demise in 1978 of the Soviet-American co-chairmanship of the Geneva forum. They also point to the importance of the CD as part of a broader international arms control process, in which there is a complementary relationship between arms control multilateralism and bilateralism. The CD is useful in helping to keep the international arms control process alive; it is also useful as a "ripening" process in facilitating superpower agreement.

THE CD AS A RIPENING PROCESS

This role of the multilateral forum is historic, and its essence was best captured in 1964 by a Canadian delegate to the ENDC. "The big conference," Richard Tait wrote,

> is a convenient platform from which the major powers can advance proposals which, while perhaps not immediately negotiable, can by virtue of the Committee's existence, be kept open for discussion and analysis. Agreements between nations are, like harvests, dependent on all sorts of uncontrollable factors — hence the appropriateness of the phrase "international climate." And, again like harvests, agreements often seem to require time to ripen and develop before the moment comes when conditions are favourable to reap the fruits of this process.[45]

To the extent that the CD can be seen as a forum in which ideas and concepts can be advanced with a view toward their eventual negotiation,

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[44] On the work of the CD as a bilateral agency see the penetrating articles by Hella Pick in *The Guardian* (February 28, 1984, March 2, 1984). On recent Soviet-American collaboration in the CD over a CW non-proliferation regime see *The New York Times*, August 27, 1986.

[45] Richard Tait, "In Defence of the Big Conference," *Disarmament and Arms Control 2* (1964), p. 336.

the ripening function of the multilateral body would appear to relate more to its regime than its norm creation role. Yet the two roles are linked in the sense that mutually or universally accepted norms must underlie stable arms control regimes. The ripening of arms control norms, moreover, is a protracted process, the most vivid examples of this role for the Geneva forum date back to its early years. The important arms control agreements of the 1960s, the partial test ban treaty, the outer-space accord, and the non-proliferation treaty were in large measure superpower accords. But each of these was based upon ENDC proposals, and the latter two in particular were discussed at length in the multilateral forum both before and after the United States and the Soviet Union had reached agreement on the core elements of the treaties.

The ripening of agreements for their eventual negotiation would appear to be an apt role for non-nuclear powers who possess a degree of arms control expertise and the diplomatic flexibility necessary for the promulgation of innovative proposals. There is clear evidence that ideas mooted by the more technically sophisticated non-nuclear states at Geneva have over time gained currency as both arms control norms and negotiating concepts. The concepts of a "seismic detection club," a "threshold" nuclear test ban, and of "verification by challenge" were first put forward by Sweden in the ENDC during the mid-1960s, to find widespread acceptance within the CD by the mid-1980s. The idea of a step-by-step approach toward a comprehensive test ban was first voiced in the CCD in the mid-1970s. Its promulgation by Canada since 1982 has facilitated a renewed and more realistic appreciation within the CD of the negotiability of a limited rather than comprehensive test ban agreement. To this end the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, established in 1976 under the CCD, has now begun to take hold in CD thinking about the verifiability of a nuclear test ban. These examples suggest that if ripening work in the CD is to be constructive, it should, where appropriate, have a technical side to it.

NON-NUCLEAR POWERS AND A CTB

The quest by non-nuclear states for a comprehensive test ban has long been an important part of their Geneva arms control diplomacy. In strictly military terms a CTB would be, in the apt words of a former Japanese ambassador to the CD, "an expression of an agreement to limit certain aspects of the development of weapons technology."[46] In particular it would impose constraints upon the modernization of nuclear weapon systems and, with any luck and forethought on the part of negotiators, upon those modernized systems deemed likely to destabilize the existing balance of power. As a militarily significant arms control measure a CTB would, or should, thus inhibit the technological development of counterforce or nuclear war-fighting systems.

In political and symbolic terms a CTB has long been viewed by many non-nuclear powers at Geneva as a measure of superpower good faith in the arms control field. A superpower agreement on a CTB has also been seen by non-nuclear states as a quid pro quo for their subscription to the non-proliferation treaty. Yet the evident recalcitrance of the United States, the less evident recalcitrance of the Soviet Union and the powerful disinterest of Britain, France and China in negotiating a CTB, the dynamism of military/technological innovation, and the de rigueur NPT review conference of 1980, have all served to make the CTB, one of the

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[46] Ryukichi Imai, "The Diplomacy of Compliance and Modern Arms Control: problems of third party participation," *International Affairs* 6 (Winter 1985-1986), p. 92.

more contentious issues. While this contention has been understandable, it has also been problematic. As a former Canadian ambassador observed:

> The intensity of feeling it generates reflects both the inherent importance of nuclear weaponry as a core element of the strategic policies of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the profound public anxieties arising from an awareness of the massive and relatively indiscriminate destructive power of such weapons. In these circumstances there may also be a consequential need to take care that the strength of our views and concerns, and the vehemence with which they may be expressed, do not become a hindrance to rational discussion of the central issues involved.[47]

By the mid-1980s a degree of consensus had emerged among most CD non-nuclear states on the appropriate verification measures for a CTB: that any adequate verification system should be based upon both national and international seismic detection techniques. No such consensus had emerged with respect to the urgency of a CTB, however, and on this issue the CD debates continued to reflect real divisions between Western non-nuclear states and the non-aligned members of the Group of 21. For the latter a comprehensive ban was seen as the most important, yet most frustrating, of issues on the CD agenda, as a test of their ability to get their way in multilateral arms control. It was not without good reason that Australia, the most activist of Western states on this issue, noted that a "comprehensive nuclear test ban is not a subject on which there is widespread or abundant patience."[48] Throughout the CD debates neutral and non-aligned impatience was exhibited principally by way of their quest for a nuclear test ban working group with a mandate to negotiate. Only with such a mandate, in the Swedish view, would the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) "at last be allowed to emerge from its discrete existence to play a central role in the field of international security."[49] In short, CTB negotiations at Geneva were seen as a

[47] CD/PV. 336.

[48] CD/PV. 359. See also Mulhall, "Australia and Disarmament Diplomacy;" William Dullforce, "Pressure builds on US to stop testing nuclear weapons," *The Financial Times*, February 5, 1986.

[49] CD/PV. 383.

necessary complement to the technical verification work to which a number of the NNA had come to subscribe.

The Western non-nuclear powers were not impervious to the arms control and diplomatic logic of the Group of 21 stand. Nor were they unsupportive of the need for a nuclear test ban working group, as an expression of multilateral movement in this field. Their own good work with seismic detection techniques was, after all, increasingly at risk as the prospects for a CTB became more remote. Their preference, however, was for a working group with a mandate to examine the issue "with a view toward negotiation." This was a diplomatic compromise between the unyielding position of the United States and Britain on the one hand and the NNA majority on the other. It also reflected, however, mainstream Western arms control thinking that the CD should examine the test ban issue through a military/strategic perspective and consider the possibility that a complete ban on all nuclear tests might be detrimental to nuclear deterrence. To date, however, the NNA, unlike the Western non-nuclear powers, have unequivocally rejected military rationales for continued nuclear testing.[50]

From the standpoint of its negotiability, a CTB has always been problematic. At the trilateral level, the *in camera* discussions initiated in 1977 between the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain held out some hope for progress on a test ban, but this was quickly dampened by British opposition and, subsequently, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. While these talks did not adjourn until 1982, they were effectively undermined by the Reagan administration when it announced in 1981, to the surprise of the Western allies, if not of the Soviet Union, that a CTB was at best a longer term US objective in view of its strategic modernization programme. Even prior to this announcement, however, it was not clear to what extent the trilateralists had overcome the verification hurdles toward a CTB, Soviet overtures in the direction of accepting on-site inspection provisions notwithstanding. Nor was it ever clear that the nuclear powers not party to these negotiations, as well as the threshold or near-nuclear states, would agree

[50] See, for instance, the statement by Venezuela, CD/PV. 361.

to a trilaterally designed CTB. As the universality of any CTB remained in question, Western non-nuclear powers were convinced that the issue had to be discussed in the multilateral CD. Yet the willingness of the trilateralists to take the Geneva forum into their confidence was limited.

Shortly before the demise of the trilaterals in July 1982, the CD had established a test ban working group with a non-negotiating mandate to explore the issues of verification and compliance. The establishment of this group was a tribute to the interlocutory talents of certain non-nuclear CD powers, particularly Brazil, Italy, and Japan. Individually or collectively they had bridged powerful differences on this matter within the CD. Yet the working group was hardly an august body. Two nuclear powers, France and China, refused to join —marking the first time since the creation of the CD that member states refused to participate in its work. And while the United States and the Soviet Union sent seismic teams, only Sweden from among CD non-nuclear powers sent technical experts to its early meetings. The working group reconvened in 1983, only to trip over the principle of consensus which UNSSOD I had bestowed upon the Geneva forum. No final report emerged from the final meeting of the working group that year, and it adjourned indefinitely. The Group of 21 opposed the re-establishment in 1984 of an ad hoc working group that did not have a negotiating mandate, while the United States would not agree to a such a mandate.

The diplomatic stalemate over the CTB mandate issue, between the Group of 21 and the East on the one hand and the Western group on the other, did little to stimulate non-nuclear power thinking about compromise nuclear test ban proposals. And, with the exception of Australia and Japan, where both public and parliamentary opinion remained actively concerned with this issue, a CTB was not uppermost on the arms control agendas of the majority of Western non-nuclear powers after 1983. Their continued interest in the subject was due largely to the firm technological stake which they (and Sweden) had in the multilateral verification process for a CTB.

The Western non-nuclear powers were united in their support of an "evolutionary" approach toward the creation of a CTB regime. This was

reaffirmed by their support for a 1984 Japanese working paper which, in essence, revisited Canada's 1982 step-by-step approach toward a nuclear test ban (NTB).[51] In line with this approach the Western CD members increasingly referred to an NTB instead of CTB, seeing a limited accord as a more achievable goal in view of the gaps in seismic detection techniques for low-yield underground nuclear explosions. These gaps, and the need of the CD to explore the military rationales for continued testing, were uppermost on the minds of these states. As West Germany explained:

> Verification of a CTB is not an easy task and nobody should proclaim that the inherent technical issues are reliably resolved. Those who tend to quote statements to this effect from earlier periods are oblivious to the rapidly changing technological environment in which both nuclear testing and verification can be operated, not to speak of the evolution, potentially rapid, of various evasion techniques.[52]

The Western non-nuclear powers were united in thinking that existing national and international seismic monitoring arrangements were not adequate for the effective verification of a comprehensive ban. It is not clear, however, that they shared a common view on the need for continued testing as part of the strategy of nuclear deterrence to which they all subscribed. But they did exhibit a clear belief that the CD should examine this issue. As the West German delegate again noted, in forthright terms:

> My country has no experience with nuclear testing but I think that a serious debate should at least take seriously the argument of those who provide factual evidence that in spite of the enhanced computational facilities, vast experimental experience and progress in non-explosion testing methods, a residue of suddenly emerging stockpile problems would still have to be solved by testing in the interest of the operability and reliability of existing nuclear forces. These questions remain legitimate and need to be answered as long as nuclear weapons still form part of the power and security equation between East and West.[53]

[51] CD/Working Paper 276.
[52] CD/PV. 340.
[53] CD/PV. 344.

In short, the NNA states did not share this perspective. The Group of 21 did not fear that such work lay beyond the purview of the CD (which, as military risk assessment analysis, it probably does). Instead, its members felt that the principal task of the CD was to find ways and means to insure adequate verification of a CTB. As a group they were not prepared to concede that barriers other than the verification quandary should be allowed to obstruct the early negotiation of a test ban treaty. But Sweden, historically in the vanguard of the NNA on this issue, signalled that it was prepared to move toward the Western position that the CD should further explore the problem of the scope of any nuclear test ban before a CTB could be brought into being. In suggesting that "a verification system must be developed in interrelationship with the scope of a prospective nuclear test ban treaty," Sweden intimated an acceptance of the Western step-by-step approach.[54] It would not, however, accept this as a long term proposition, as an alternative to a CTB. Patience has always been an important part of the CD ripening process, but on this issue the NNA continued to signal that their patience had limits.

NON-NUCLEAR POWERS AND A CW CONVENTION

The aims of the Conference on Disarmament in its negotiation of a chemical weapons convention are formidable. While the CD, to its credit, is in the vanguard of international thinking about the dangers of chemical weaponry, there is little evidence, as one commentator suggests, "that policy-makers have begun to appreciate the problem or to think through the available options for contending with it."[55] Yet the dilemma does not lie simply with the absence of statesmanship, or the needed political will for agreement on a CW treaty; the challenge which the CD negotiators continue to face, lies in the very nature of a CW treaty as an effective instrument of arms control and international security.

The dialogues over this issue have continued in a fitful fashion since

[54] CD/PV. 383.

[55] Brad Roberts, "Chemical Proliferation and Policy," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1985), p. 155.

they were first proposed by Sweden to the Geneva ENDC in 1968. They now serve as an acid test of the efficacy of the CD as a negotiating forum, so that it can escape from what the West German daily, *Die Zeit*, has described as a "shadowy existence."[56] The Geneva CW talks also serve, if not, as Julian Perry Robinson has observed, "as a proving ground for the future of arms control," then most certainly as a proving ground for the future of multilateral arms control as a formal treaty-oriented process.[57] In its CW negotiating efforts the CD is looking toward a law-making treaty which would be comprehensive or universal with respect to the scope of its prohibitions; it is seeking a non-proliferation accord which would proscribe the development or acquisition of chemical weapons by states not already possessing them; and it is seeking a disarmament regime — the effective elimination of all stocks of chemical weapons. As Robinson observes further:

> The negotiating objective subscribed to by all participants is not a mere reduction or ceiling, but a full-blown measure of disarmament. In accepting this objective, governments are tacitly acknowledging that in some circumstances arms control may serve not only as an adjunct but also as an alternative to military strength as a determinant of security.[58]

To this end a CW convention must also serve as a test of the efficacy of an intrusive multilateral verification regime. To date, however, with the possible exception of the 1988 INF accord, no arms control agreement provides for the verification of the elimination of an entire class of weaponry.[59]

By the end of 1986 the CD negotiators had arrived at a substantial measure of agreement on the outline and a number of the key provisions for a CW accord. Consensus had been reached that a treaty should encompass issues relating to the production, development, transfer, and

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[56] In *The German Tribune*, September 29, 1985, p. 2.

[57] Julian Perry Robinson, "The Negotiations on Chemical Warfare Arms Control," *Arms Control: The Journal of Arms Control and Disarmament 1* (May 1980), p. 30.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Frank Elbe, "Banning Chemical Weapons," *International Perspectives* (January/February 1985), p.17.

use of chemical weapons, as well as their destruction. There had also been measurable progress with respect to the definition of a chemical weapon, and the identification of key "precursors" — civilian chemicals which could be used in the production of highly toxic CW agents. The technical work of the CD has provided the basis for agreement among members of the recently established Brussels Suppliers Club on the imposition of controls over the export of these civilian chemicals.[60] Yet, as CD negotiators are well aware, hard issues remain on their CW agenda. Principal among these, it is commonly observed, are verification quandaries: the modalities of "routine" and on-site challenge inspection measures to ensure compliance with the non-production and elimination of chemical weapon stocks, and the intrusiveness of monitoring techniques over the world-wide civilian chemical industry.

In a wider sense, however, the challenge of verification is not just a technical but a military matter. The threat to a CW convention, or to its successful negotiation in the first instance, does not lie just with the possibility of non-compliance or evasion, but with the perceived military utility of chemical weapons as instruments of deterrence or war.[61] The use of CW figures prominently in Soviet military doctrine, and the United States, as a deterrent against possible Soviet first use of CW in war, has recently provided for the funding of the production of lethal binary weapons.[62] It is estimated that approximately fifteen nations now possess chemical weapons; it is also widely feared that the threat of the further proliferation of CW — largely but not exclusively in the Third World, as the "poor man's absolute weapon" — looms large.[63] The inability of the international community to prohibit the use of chemical weapons in this region has not helped to stimulate confidence among states in CW arms control. It can be said that the known instances of the

[60] Elisa D. Harris, "CW Arms Control: A Regime Under Attack," *Arms Control Today* (September 1986); Robinson, "Disarmament and other options," p. 71.

[61] Robinson, "The Negotiations on Chemical Warfare," p. 48

[62] John H. King, "The Comprehensive Chemical Weapons Ban: Problems and Possibilities," *Arms Control Today* (September 1986).

[63] See George Quester, "The Non-Aligned States and Arms Control," in Luck, ed., *Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative*, p. 136. See also Lesley Dixon, "Chemical warfare - the third option?" *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 10, 1987.

use of chemical weapons have challenged the viability of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which aimed at the prohibition of the first use of both biological and chemical weapons.

In light of the military rationales for chemical weapons, as instruments of deterrence and war, a CW convention would have to be seen by party states in cost/benefit security terms. What price is the Soviet Union prepared to pay, with respect to its perceived military security requirements, for international control of US binary weapons production? What price is the United States prepared to pay, with respect to its perceived military security requirements, for international control over the vast Soviet CW arsenal? What price are the two principal chemical weapon adversaries prepared to pay, as partners, in ensuring international control over the non-proliferation and elimination of chemical weapons in the Third World? The price would have to be Soviet-American CW disarmament, as a quid pro quo for Third World agreement on a comprehensive CW ban. Any agreement on a CW convention without full American and Soviet support and participation is unthinkable. Yet, while the USSR and the USA were able to extend their arms control writ to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), they will not be able to replicate this in any CW convention.[64]

The early deliberations at Geneva over a CW convention were analogous to those over a CTB. Both dated back to the late 1960s, and both were sustained in large measure by the innovative ideas and diplomacy of key, technically advanced non-nuclear states. Principally these were Sweden and Canada, with the active support of Japan and the Netherlands. A 1972 Canadian proposal that the CCD CW deliberations focus on high-toxicity elements, became the basis for the 1974 Soviet-American summit agreement on the creation of a "joint initiative" which the two powers would put to the Geneva multilateral forum. But with the emergence of superpower arms control bilateralism by the early 1970s, the CCD, in Robinson's words, "ceased to have the primary negotiating role, this now passing to whatever private discussions the two superpowers might arrange between themselves."

[64] Robinson, "The Negotiations on Chemical Warfare," pp. 34-35.

The CCD "marked time" on chemical weapons, awaiting disclosure of the bilateral joint initiative, but kept the issue alive "through continued exchanges of views and discussion of technical detail."[65]

The arcane technical detail which the CCD amassed was not unimportant to the future role of the multilateral forum in the negotiation of a CW treaty. As an American delegate accurately observed in 1985, "most delegations here have the benefit of fairly substantive sophistication in the area of CW. This issue has been under negotiation for some period of time. . . ."[66] In the second half of the 1970s, however, the technical sophistication shared by most CCD delegations was still rudimentary, particularly with respect to the matter of verification. Their expertise was not sufficient to give them any real influence over the Soviet-American bilateral process. The exclusivity of superpower bilateralism bothered the non-nuclear states at Geneva nevertheless. The "joint initiative" which had been promised in Soviet-American summitry had not materialized, and the negative attitude of the superpowers toward engaging the multilateral forum in their CW negotiations lent little hope that it would. Increasingly fearful for the fate of the Geneva forum, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden found further reasons for pressing the United States and the Soviet Union to include the newly-established CD in their work.

UNSSOD I, it will be remembered, had reaffirmed the role of the CD as a negotiating body, and it seemed to these technically oriented states that the time was now increasingly ripe for the injection of their technical skills and knowledge into the CW negotiating process. Other CD non-nuclear powers, for whom a CW convention was not at that time the priority that nuclear issues were, also felt that the time was ripe for CD involvement, as a means for pressing the two superpowers to summon the political will to reach agreement on a CW treaty. UNSSOD I, furthermore, had also given the CD a mandate to explore measures of verification. On this issue the superpowers showed some promise of movement, with apparent Soviet acceptance in principle of the concept

[65] Ibid, p. 31.
[66] CD/PV. 322.

of on-site challenge inspection. Yet this movement was limited, and the four technically oriented non-nuclear powers in the CD came to fear for the fate of the bilateral as well as the multilateral negotiating process. As facilitators, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden envisaged and collaborated upon a proposal to establish a CW verification agency akin to the Group of Scientific Experts, and called upon the superpowers for more in-depth progress reports to the CD to stimulate its work in the verification field.

A CW verification agency did not materialize, but the Group of Four continued to exert gentle pressure on the superpower negotiators for greater collaboration with the CD. The catalytic behaviour of these states did not seem dampened by the onset of the new Cold War. The CW issue was thus unique with respect to negotiability, the necessity for negotiating at the multilateral level, and in the fund of expertise which the CD had garnered. These factors strengthened the perception of the Group of Four that the CW issue should remain immune to the vicissitudes of East-West political tensions. Ironically, however, a heightening of these tensions helped to enlarge this small core of non-nuclear states.[67]

With the 1979 announcement of NATO's Long-Term Defence Programme, under which the alliance committed itself to CW modernization, failing international agreement on the arms control front, Western Europeans and their governments became exercised over the chemical weapons issue.[68] At Geneva, Italy and West Germany joined Canada and the Netherlands as exponents of a CW arms control regime, and exhibited this by producing working papers and by urging the United States to be more flexible and agree to the establishment of a CW working group.[69] In the wake of reports on the use of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the interest of a number of non-aligned CD members in the urgent negotiation of a CW convention

[67] Interviews, Geneva, February 1986.

[68] Julian Perry Robinson, "Disarmament and Other Options for Western Policy-making on Chemical Weapons," *International Affairs 63* (Winter 1986/1987), p. 65.

[69] CD/41; CD/113; CD/203; CD/316.

heightened perceptibly. Among Warsaw Pact members, Poland and East Germany became more businesslike and technically neutral in urging flexibility and a spirit of compromise on the part of both major powers.[70] By 1982 there was a consensus among most non-nuclear states in favour, not just of the establishment of a CW working group, but of a group with a mandate to negotiate a CW treaty.

By 1983 the two superpowers had also come to recognize that the negotiation of any effective and comprehensive CW regime was a multilateral affair. With their CW bilaterals having adjourned indefinitely, they agreed to the establishment of a CW working group at Geneva with a negotiating mandate. Thus, for the first time in its brief history, the CD found itself able to move into a negotiating phase over one of the most important items on its agenda.

A consensus has emerged among the non-nuclear powers at Geneva on the military importance and the urgency of a CW accord. To these ends all the non-nuclear states who have been actively concerned with this issue in the CD (and this would include a core group who have over time served as chairmen or as members of the CW ad hoc working group) have shown a willingness to help to bring a CW convention to fruition.[71] As the Canadian ambassador observed, if a CW accord is to be a priority, then "we have to show it. We have to show a readiness to increase the time devoted to the task of achieving a ban on CW . . . . It is open to us to utilize the tremendous wealth of talent in this room, backed up by expertise, and share it and pool it with one another."[72]

But few, if any, of these states have been strictly neutral, as diplomatic catalysts should be. Most have national military or civilian technological interests at stake in the negotiations which in some measure explain the importance which they have attached to a CW convention. The interplay of these interests, as they have emerged during the negotiations,

[70] CD/PV. 290; CD/PV. 292; CD/PV. 337; CD/PV. 381.

[71] This core group included Australia, Brazil, Canada, East Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and West Germany.

[72] CD/PV. 322.

have complicated and slowed down their pace. And the roots of these interests — in a sense of vulnerability to the CW threat, in alliance defence commitments, and in civilian chemical industries and technologies — also serve to explain how the non-nuclear states have come to differ along intra- and especially inter-group lines.

With respect to the fundamental issue of the verification of compliance with the elimination of existing stocks of chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union have inevitably established the parameters of CD debates. This has not been the case, however, with regard to the monitoring of the world-wide chemical industry to ensure a prohibition on the diversion of chemical agents from peaceful to military uses. A consensus now exists in the CD that the integrity of civilian chemical interests should be preserved in any CW convention. There is no consensus as yet, however, on how intrusive the monitoring of this industry should be in order to preserve the integrity of a CW arms control convention.

The plenary debates suggest that the United States, with the support of Canada and Australia, would prefer fairly stringent modes of verification. Behind their arms control thinking lies a deep-seated American distrust of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet penchant for secrecy, an equally deep-seated Canadian concern over the potential proliferation of chemical weapons, and a deep-seated Australian concern that any convention must embody an ironclad ban on the use of CW.[73] Chemical weapons, the Australian delegate warned the CD, "should never be used; and thus the case for their complete elimination and their nonproduction is absolute."[74] And if the Australian concern is rooted in fears over the use of chemical weapons, Canada's concern clearly reflects its historic and at times agonizing involvement with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. "I have said again and again," the Canadian ambassador reminded the CD, "that we regard this comprehensive chemical weapons convention as an attempt to develop a non-proliferation treaty."[75]

[73] CD/PV. 309.
[74] CD/PV. 292.
[75] CD/PV. 322.

Among Western members to the CD, Japan and West Germany have been the most forthright in expressing their concern and their interest that a CW convention should not place "undue limits" (in Japan's words) upon the civilian chemical sphere.[76] In the CD debates on CW, the conflicting aims of arms control safeguards on the one hand, and the sanctity of peaceful industrial and technological interests on the other, have not aroused the same degree of tension among Western non-nuclear powers that the analogous debates over the NPT did in the ENDC during the 1960s. But the tensions have been real in the CD, if nuanced.[77] Inevitably, differences would revolve around the concept of "adequate" verification, and among Western non-nuclear powers, West Germany has emerged as the principal exponent of the legitimacy of this concept in any CW convention. The issue for the Federal Republic,however, is not just the integrity of its chemical industry, but an early and satisfactory resolution of the NATO alliance CW dilemmas which continue to exercise the West German body politic.[78] Thus, while Canada would accent the dangers of CW proliferation, West Germany sees the "most acute threat" emanating from existing stocks of chemical weapons, in Europe as elsewhere.[79]

The Group of 21 has shared Canada's concern over the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, and its members have also shared the West German concern for the integrity of peaceful developments in the industrial chemical sphere. But there is a gulf between the non-aligned and the Western non-nuclear powers with respect to their positions on the legitimacy of NATO CW defensive measures, and their respective capabilities in the civilian chemical field. Both issues have given rise to sharp Third World comment which draws comparisons with the discriminatory NPT, an attempt, as they see it, by the armed to disarm the unarmed and an attempt to maintain the economic hegemony of the North over the South. The NNA have not been concerned with protecting the secrets of a developed and mature peaceful chemical

[76] CD/PV. 307. See also CD/PV. 310, 339, 381.

[77] Robinson, "Disarmament and other options," p. 78; Elbe, "Banning chemical weapons," p. 17.

[78] *The German Tribune*, September 29, 1985.

[79] CD/PV. 310.

industry; rather, their concern has been with the sovereign right of Third World states to develop this capability.

On these military and economic issues, leadership roles within the Group of 21 have been assumed by Argentina, Brazil, and Pakistan. On the military/security side, they have voiced clear opposition to Western non-nuclear power proposals and propositions that, during the process of eliminating chemical weapons stocks, alliance members should maintain defensive CW capabilities. "We hope," the delegate from Pakistan advised the CD, "that chemical weapon States will eschew viewing the destruction process exclusively from their own military perspective:"

> As a non-aligned and non-chemical weapon state, we find it difficult to appreciate the spending of valuable time over working out agreed destruction schedules whose central objective appears to be to ensure that the security of the two alliance systems is not put in jeopardy during the elimination process.[80]

The delegate from Argentina was equally explicit on this point:

> If all CW arsenals are going to be destroyed, there is no need to retain super-toxic lethal weapons for "protective" purposes. We have serious reservations about a provision of this kind, in that it is tantamount to perpetuating or de facto legalizing, through a convention aimed at eliminating chemical weapons, the inequality currently existing between states possessing and states not possessing such weapons.... The complete destruction of existing arsenals by the few countries which possess chemical weapons is the necessary counterpart and prerequisite for the restrictions which those that do not possess and do not intend to possess chemical weapons have to accept on their activities.[81]

The assertion that CW disarmament is a prerequisite for universal subscription to any future CW convention does not bode well for its early realization.[82] The problem stems from the fundamental challenge

[80] CD/PV. 339.
[81] CD/PV. 354.
[82] CD/PV. 354; CD/PV. 323.

which the perceived military utility of chemical weapons poses to the negotiation of a CW convention, a challenge which has not so far been seriously addressed in the CD. It also stems from the quest by NNA states for a non-discriminatory CW convention, and it may well be the case, as it was with the NPT, that a majority of developing states are as much concerned about potential discrimination in the civilian technological sector as they are with discrimination in the military field.[83]

In expressing the importance for developing countries of the relationship between their economic and social progress, on the one hand, and their sovereign right to develop a technological and industrial capability in the peaceful chemical field, on the other, Brazil and other NNA leaders have asserted that a CW convention should not in any way attempt to regulate civil chemical industries.[84] This position is far removed from Western principles for stringent or even adequate verification measures. If this position is adhered to by NNA states, it will make the negotiation of an effective CW convention all the more problematic.

Non-nuclear Powers and Arms Control in Outer Space

Until 1983 very limited work had been accomplished in the CD on outer space issues. Italy, Canada and the Netherlands had endeavoured, in a series of working papers, to enlighten CD member states about the effects of military space technologies on nuclear deterrence. These states had also tried to alert the CD about the possible untoward effects of military/technological innovations on the existing legal regime for outer space.[85] By 1983 this diplomatic work was, paradoxically, to be aided by advances in military technology, when the doctrinal and technological challenges to the existing military order in outer space grew sharper with the developing interest of the superpowers in strategic defences. More moderate and technologically advanced members of the Group of 21 came to share Western non-nuclear state concerns about the possible

[83] CD/PV. 323.

[84] Ibid.

[85] See *Canada, Arms Control and Outer Space*, CD/320, 26 August 1982.

implications of strategic defence systems for the legitimate military and civilian uses of satellite reconnaissance systems.[86]

In the CD, the security and arms control concerns of these non-nuclear states were reflected in a quest to establish an outer space working group. Initially the interest of the Western states in such a forum had been stimulated by the indifference of the superpower bilateralists toward involving the CD in their post-1978 discussions over anti-satellite (ASAT) technologies and systems. When these bilaterals were stalled in 1982, concern for the establishment of a CD outer space working group heightened perceptibly. However, the evident and mounting desire of the Group of 21 for a CD working group with a mandate to negotiate an outer space arms control accord which would prohibit ASATs was at this time fuelled by a declared Soviet interest in preventing the "militarization" of outer space. These two trends led Western non-nuclear powers into intense rounds of coalition diplomacy, whereby they attempted to blunt American objections to a CD working group.[87] From the standpoint of both progress in the CD on an outer space accord and the public relations advantage which the East enjoyed at this time, these Western powers recognized the need to offset American isolation and foster American leadership. Without this leadership, the scope for Western initiatives in the CD would be severely circumscribed.

From 1983 on Western non-nuclear powers also looked forward to the establishment of regulations on multilateral anti-satellite technologies. For geo-strategic reasons the United States, however, remained opposed to any constraints on ASATs, particularly a ban on the development of low-altitude systems which could in wartime disrupt the targeting capabilities of the adversary. Washington was less than sympathetic to the promulgation by its allies of any arms control

[86] See the Swedish statement CD/PV. 168. See also Aaron Karp, "Space technologies in the Third World: commercialization and the spread of ballistic missiles," *Space Policy* (May 1986); Juan S. Roederev, "The participation of developing countries in space research," *Space Policy* (August 1985).

[87] Dahlitz, "ASAT and Related Weapons," p. 182.

initiatives in this area.[88] Yet these states felt that the challenge posed by new technologies to the existing outer space arms control regime warranted discussion at Geneva, and to this end they set about finding a compromise mandate for a CD outer space working group.

This was a contentious matter but a workable endeavour. The Group of 21 as a whole was not as inflexible on the mandate terms for an outer space working group as it was over the CTB issue. The Soviet Union, for its part, professed opposition to anything less than a comprehensive ban on all space weapons; yet, as the Aspen Institute noted, Moscow, logically, might also have found it hard to reject substantive proposals on ASAT that represented the beginning of a broader dialogue on space.[89] The American negociators, just as logically, had an interest in taking the stalled ASAT issue to the CD, under the rubric of an outer space working group, to ensure a degree of continuity in their talks with the Soviet Union, and to gain Western allied support for their position in inter-agency debates in Washington. Increasingly, these allies were found. With the March 1983 announcement of the US Strategic Defence Initiative, Australia, Japan, Norway and West Germany joined Italy, Canada and the Netherlands in gently urging the United States to take more seriously the interest of the CD in discussions over an arms control regime for anti-satellite systems.

In 1983 the United States agreed to a non-negotiating mandate proposal under which a CD working group would examine the existing legal regime for outer space. "My delegation," the American ambassador to the CD observed, "has admittedly been among those who were most skeptical of the usefulness of a working group on this subject. But we listened to the arguments of our colleagues and, while not entirely convinced, we dropped our opposition to a working group per se."[90] Alas, the Soviet Union was not to be so convinced, and took the mandate proposal under lengthy study.

[88] See Leslie Gelb, *The New York Times*, August 17, 1984; and *Key Issues in American Security: Anti-Satellite Weapons in U.S. Military Space Policy*. The 1985 Aspen Policy Report, Aspen Institute, November, 1985.

[89] Ibid, p. 7.

[90] CD/PV. 236.

In August 1984, once again largely as a consequence of Western coalition diplomacy, the United States announced to the Geneva forum that it was prepared to accept a broader exploratory mandate for a CD outer space working group, empowered "to examine and to identify through substantive and general consideration issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space." This, the American delegation felt, was "an honourable way out of the mandate impasse." This new position complemented an earlier American acceptance of a Soviet offer to meet in Vienna that September to "negotiate and conclude agreements concerning the militarization of outer space, including anti-satellite systems."[91] By 29 March 1985, subsequent to the resumption that 12 March of Soviet-American bilateral talks on outer space, both the East and the Group of 21 accepted the Western compromise mandate. The decision to establish this ad hoc committee (as CD working groups were termed after 1983) was, in Sweden's words, "one of the CD's most positive developments."[92]

The strong American reservations about a negotiating mandate for a CD outer space ad hoc group were not unfounded. The CD, by the mid-1980s, was not in a position to negotiate an outer space arms control accord. In this area both superpower and non-nuclear power delegations were working in the absence of clear policy positions on the part of their respective governments. Yet the CD remains in a good position to ripen the issues for the future negotiation of an outer space regime. It can, as the Italian delegate succinctly noted, "facilitate a better knowledge of the problems," and identify "those aspects deserving the attention of the international community as a whole."[93]

More so than any other potentially negotiable issues on the CD agenda, outer space, and ASAT regulation in particular, involve sensitive military/security and arms control matters bearing upon the stability of the Soviet-American strategic balance — specifically strategic defences and the fate of the 1972 ABM accord. These issues, moreover, interlace

[91] CD/PV. 286.
[92] CD/PV. 311.
[93] CD/PV. 330.

in complex military and political ways with the security and arms control interests of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. And only in the CW debates is there a parallel to be found in the degree to which the CD outer space issue cuts across the commercial and civilian technological interests of advanced and developing non-nuclear powers.

Adding to the complexity of the outer space issue is the need to define the relationship between the multilateral body and superpower bilateralism by finding a role for the CD in the outer space negotiating process that does not undermine the emergence of superpower strategic and arms control understandings.[94] For the CD, this dilemma is one of jurisdiction and responsibility; it is also one of knowledge and understanding, because the lesser states at Geneva are not privy to the expertise which the two major nuclear powers share. "I leave open," the West German delegate opined on this matter, "to what extent a multilateral assembly can be the ultimate judge for the interpretation of bilateral treaties like the ABM treaty."[95]

Another complexity, and of much concern to non-nuclear powers who see in international law the surest guardian of their interests *vis-à-vis* the technological exuberance of the superpowers, relates to the gaps and ambiguities in existing legal concepts for an arms control outer space regime.[96] What are the meanings of terms like: "peaceful purposes," "military uses," "militarization," "further militarization," "arms racing," or the "prevention" thereof in outer space? Does "militarization" encompass "military uses," which can be legitimate and useful for the standpoint of military stability? Does "further militarization" imply "arms racing?" Is there an "arms race" in outer space to be "prevented," or has it already begun? Or is the commonly used and much abused notion of arms race prevention meant, in an outer space context, to proscribe the development and deployment of "threatening" or "destabilizing" weapons systems?

Through its 1986 working paper International Law and Outer Space,

[94] CD/PV. 292; CD/PV.358.
[95] CD/PV. 318.
[96] CD/PV. 309 (the Netherlands)

Canada emerged at the forefront of non-nuclear powers in bringing these issues to the attention of CD members, and drew deserved praise.[97] Yet many of these legal concepts reflect underlying military/technological complexities, for instance, the inherent ambiguity in weapons systems from the standpoints of "peaceful uses" and "military stability." The legitimacy of the use of satellite systems for the peaceful purpose of ensuring military stability is increasingly recognized in the CD and, given the efficacy of the strategy of mutual nuclear deterrence, this is a salutary development. It seems that the CD is moving toward the 1982 Canadian idea put to UNSSOD II, that "weapons" for use in outer space should be proscribed. But, as is now widely recognized in the CD as elsewhere, satellite systems which confer military stability can also compromise the invulnerability of retaliatory forces — they can be useful in war. As the delegate from Argentina soberly reminded the CD in 1983, "my country has had a direct and painful experience with the consequences of the military use of satellites."[98]

These legal and military/technical ambiguities perplex the CD negotiators. Ambiguities are also to be found in the debate over legitimate civilian outer space activities on the one hand and the quest for a stable outer space arms control accord on the other. The complication here is that the missions to which civilian activities are directed may not be dedicated only to those functions; many of the technologies for the civilian uses of outer space are inherently dual-capable, and may thus be used for military purposes — benign or otherwise. This dilemma confounds the CD quest for an effective outer space arms control verification regime, which in turn will increasingly be found to be problematic from the standpoint of multilateral involvement in the verification process. Clearly, multilateral verification will be a necessary part of any effective and non-discriminatory outer space arms control regime, and the CD debates on this matter have reflected a strengthened interest on the part of a number of non-nuclear states in the concept of an

[97] Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Working Paper Terminology Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space*, Ottawa, July, 1986. See also the *Canadian Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space*, CD/618, 23 July 1985.

[98] CD/PV. 215.

international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA).[99] But at some point hard questions will have to be posed at Geneva with respect to the technological, political, financial and administrative feasibility of this concept.[100]

With the clear exception of India, openly hostile to what it terms the "illusion of nuclear deterrence," a majority of CD non-nuclear powers support the underlying rationales for an outer space arms control regime.[101] These rationales include the legitimacy of the military uses of outer space for "peaceful" purposes, and the related need to protect satellite systems from the threat of emerging technologies. As the Italian delegate observed, misgivings had been expressed in the 1985 meetings of the outer space ad hoc committee about the role of observation satellites on the grounds of their "alleged capability to intrude into the sphere of national sovereignty." But the "importance of the role of such satellites in ensuring compliance with disarmament agreements was widely recognized, together with the stabilizing effect of this specific form of the military use of space."

> These debates . . . provide a basis for defining the angle from which the problem of the military use of space and its implications for consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space should also be examined. If space is to be used for peaceful purposes only, the basic criterion to judge whether space activities are compatible with this purpose is not so much their military or civilian nature, but rather their capability to enhance stability.[102]

Western, Eastern and Group of 21 non-nuclear powers alike have exhibited an awareness of the military/technological ambiguities in "stabilizing" weapons systems, and the inherent dangers of a "system" of mutual nuclear deterrence.[103] Yet, a number of these states have also expressed the fear that superpower strategic defence programmes pose a

[99] CD/PV. 330 (Pakistan).

[100] CD/PV. 291 (Japan); CD/PV. 330 (Italy).

[101] For India's position on nuclear deterrence see: CD/PV. 262; CD/PV. 333.

[102] CD/PV. 348.

[103] CD/PV. 168 (Sweden); CD/PV. 296 (Argentina).

significant challenge to existing arms control measures which proscribe wide scale ballistic missile defences and legitimize satellite verification and military intelligence missions. By default, emerging strategic defence technologies have thus propelled non-nuclear states in the CD into the role of proponents of the existing strategic order.[104] As the delegate from Sweden observed, "we shall have to recognize that deterrence is the guiding doctrine against which the present developments must be analyzed."[105]

Eastern non-nuclear powers have used the CD to signal their thinking along these lines to the West, and perhaps also to Moscow.[106] Western non-nuclear powers have used the Geneva forum to signal their views to the East, and perhaps also to Washington.[107] "The need to safeguard satellites as instruments of strategic stability," the West German delegate observed, is "an issue that must elude the competence of only a limited number of countries."[108] The non-aligned have invoked in the CD the important principle of outer space as the common heritage of mankind.[109] They have also invoked the spirit and the letter of the perhaps equally important 1985 Delhi Declaration, by which the six parties to the five-continent peace initiative declared that they were prepared to "make an effective contribution to creating an essential trust between the two principal nuclear powers and between the two main military alliances."[110]

It is, therefore, not altogether clear at this stage of the deliberations in the CD that its more insecure and dissatisfied Third World members would act as spoilers of a multilateral outer space arms control regime which focussed principally on East-West security interests. But this

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[104] CD/PV. 290 (Poland); CD/PV. 296 (Argentina); CD/PV. 296 (Sri Lanka); CD/PV. 303 (East Germany); CD/PV. 358 (Pakistan).

[105] CD/PV. 252.

[106] CD/PV. 235; CD/PV. 255.

[107] CD/PV. 296 (Italy); CD/PV. 309 (Netherlands); CD/PV. 325 (Australia).

[108] CD/PV. 289.

[109] CD/PV. 330. (Pakistan).

[110] CD/PV. 296 (Argentina); CD/PV. 301 (Mexico). The six states party to this initiative were Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania.

possibility has been expressed at Geneva, mainly by non-signatories to the NPT.[111] An important distinction must now be drawn between moderate and revisionist trends within this small group of influential non-nuclear powers. But in signalling their disquiet about a discriminatory outer space arms control regime, these states have, on this issue, sown the seeds for possible future discord in the CD.

[111] CD/PV. 330 (Pakistan).

CONCLUSIONS

Much could and perhaps should be said in this concluding note about the fact that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has yet to produce an arms control accord. It is, after all, the principal multilateral negotiating forum for a spectrum of arms control issues which relate in very real ways to international security. Chief among these are a chemical weapons convention, a refurbished outer space arms control regime, and a nuclear test ban accord.

The verifiability of a nuclear test ban, and its benefits from a military standpoint, are still under challenge. At a time, however, when the depth of superpower commitments to arms control is also perhaps open to question, a test ban accord could well have important political and symbolic benefits as a signal of Soviet-American earnest in the arms control field. From a military standpoint, the cases to be made for a CW convention and an outer space accord are more clear-cut. A verifiable and militarily significant CW regime would impose constraints upon the proliferation and wartime use of a most sinister weapon of mass destruction. A verifiable and militarily significant outer space accord would impose constraints upon the development of weapons technologies, and anti-satellite technologies in particular, which otherwise might well inject potent elements of instability into the existing strategic balance of power. As a consequence of scientific and technological innovations, coupled with the innate insecurity of nations, there is a sense of urgency surrounding the need for arms control regimes in the CW and ASAT fields. This sense of urgency dramatizes the agonizingly slow pace of CD work.

Much could also be said in this concluding note about the loci of responsibility for the slow pace of CD work. Much could be said too about the procedural dilemmas of multilateral arms control efforts, which are epitomized in the CD exercise.[112] In an important sense, however, the ingrained procedural dilemmas of the Geneva forum mirror deeper conundrums: the evident lack of political will on the part of states and statesmen to reach agreement, and the intractability of the issues under negotiation. It is the latter conundrum which in the final analysis points to where culpability truly lies for the apparent inability of the CD to produce. The complexity of the issues which are uppermost on the CD agenda is, however, paradoxical. It suggests the importance of the multilateral environment at Geneva as a longer-term process, and the importance of this process for the conduct of non-nuclear state arms control diplomacy.

To be sure, responsibility does lie principally with the United States and the Soviet Union for the fact that the CD is not nearer than it is to an agreement on the central issues on its agenda — a CW regime, an outer space accord, and a nuclear test ban — simply because their weapons postures and programmes would be most affected by multilateral agreements in these fields. On balance, it is fair to say that they have not until recently exhibited the degree of diplomatic leadership in the CD that is appropriate to their status as superpowers.

Yet, if the notion of "culpability" is at all appropriate in reference to the dilemmas of arms control multilateralism, the lesser states at Geneva have been at fault as well. Among the non-nuclear members of the CD, only the Western states and Sweden have with any degree of consistency put forward concepts and proposals sufficiently sophisticated to warrant recognition as constructive elements of a negotiating process. The CD has a mandate to negotiate arms control measures, and it is now widely recognized at Geneva that Soviet-American agreement on any arms

[112] On the procedural dilemmas of the CD, see J. Alan Beesley, "The United Nations and Disarmament at Forty," *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations VIII* (Summer 1985).

control accord is a prerequisite for multilateral consensus. Accordingly, a principal and appropriate role for non-nuclear parties to this process is as catalysts, to facilitate superpower agreement.

Because of the potential impact of any negotiated CW and outer space accords on the military and economic interests of technologically advanced non-nuclear powers, however, agreements in these fields must be multilateral in scope if they are to be effective and durable. The developing military interest of these states in outer space programmes, and indeed the incipient interest of developing and insecure non-nuclear states in chemical weapons, dictate the necessity of their fuller involvement in the multilateral arms control process than has been the case to date. So too does the increased involvement of advanced non-nuclear states in the "civilian" side to outer space and chemical programmes. Yet particularly within the Group of 21, technologically advanced non-nuclear states have expressed deep misgivings about the potentially discriminatory nature of superpower-designed CW and outer space accords, as instruments of a Northern military and economic hegemony. These states could well act as spoilers of multilateral accords designed to curb the proliferation of chemical weapons and restrain the uses of technology in space, as they did in the case of the non-proliferation regime.

In expressing their misgivings about discriminatory arms control regimes, revisionist non-nuclear states have slowed down the pace of CD deliberations. They have at times been obstructionist. This concept, as it relates to the diplomatic behaviour of these states, is not a misnomer. It is, however, troublesome when used as an opprobrium. So used, it would presume the existence of objective standards for arms control and for diplomatic behaviour, by which the postures of non-nuclear (and nuclear) states can be judged. The fact remains that powerful differences of interest and perspective continue to exist between revisionist Third World states and Western non-nuclear powers. In their essence, these differences continue to revolve around the acceptability of existing military, technological and economic orders: should arms control be viewed as an instrument to help maintain the existing system or as a component part of a grander alternative?

As a consequence of scientific and technological advances in both the military and civilian spheres, arms control multilateralism can no longer ignore these differences in world views. Nor can the multilateral exercise peremptorily decide in favour of one perspective over the other. This happened in large measure during the multilateral negotiations at Geneva over the NPT, principally for the sake of superpower agreement. Instead, and while not discounting the critical nature of Soviet-American bilateral agreement to arms control and arms control multilateralism, it is a principal task of the CD to forge a working consensus between the disparate views of technologically advanced non-nuclear states. Notwithstanding the sense of urgency which surrounds the negotiations of CW and ASAT accords, this task must be recognized for what it is and will be — a lengthy and laborious process. In the CW and outer space areas at least, there are neither technical nor political quick fixes for multilateral arms control.

It is here that the norm-creation role of the CD must continue to come into play. Recognizing their shared vulnerability to superpower military capabilities, and the importance of their own technological capabilities to arms control, advanced non-nuclear states possess particular responsibilities in the norm creation field. In an era of widespread technological innovation, the exercise of these responsibilities and the creation of norms are crucial to arms control multilateralism; in turn, multilateralism is critical to the arms control diplomacy of non-nuclear states. If they are to have an impact upon the superpower bilateral dialogues, these states must arrive at a working consensus on the aims and requirements of arms control. To date, the creation of firm understandings about these aims and requirements has eluded the non-nuclear members of the CD. But elements of a limited consensus do seem to exist.

So far, the chief contributions toward the creation of multilateral arms control norms in the CD have come from the Western non-nuclear members. In the main, these contributions have related to the logic of arms control as a handmaiden of a system of nuclear deterrence, to a strengthened legal regime for the military uses of outer space, to the importance of non-proliferation in both the chemical and nuclear fields,

and (with the active support of Sweden) to the importance of adequate verification measures for arms control. The norm creation efforts of these states can be attributed to an enlightened sense of diplomatic responsibility. They can also be attributed to the diplomatic, legal, and technological assets at the service of these powers, which are not shared by the majority of non-nuclear states at Geneva. While these assets do not match those of the superpowers, the Western non-nuclear states do not have an ultimate responsibility for matters of war and peace; thus they have a diplomatic flexibility which is unique.

The principal beneficiaries of Western efforts have been the non-aligned members of the Group of 21. This group is no longer monolithic in its expressed hostility toward nuclear deterrence, and it is, as a whole, no longer convinced that political will alone is the essential requirement for arms control. Moderates within the Group of 21 have come to accept to some degree the logic of the Western technical approach to arms control, as a means of facilitating political agreement. This shift has been most clearly expressed in the verification field, and can be seen as one of the more important facets of the norm creation role of the multilateral CD. Western efforts to this end were neither planned nor orchestrated; they evolved as a consequence of the opportunities provided by the Geneva environment, and its expert working groups in particular, for interdisciplinary collaboration between delegations on the part of diplomats, scientists, and lawyers. Above all, however, the evident change in attitude within the CD toward nuclear deterrence and arms control must be ascribed to the emergence of a new military challenge: the development by the mid-1980s of potentially destabilizing superpower technologies and doctrines in the field of strategic defence. The norm creation diplomacy of Western non-nuclear powers was, paradoxically, a beneficiary of this challenge.

The multilateral environment of the CD has been an important, if limited, medium for the development of collaborative arms control diplomacy, cutting across the formal group alignments. Yet the multilateral exercise has also helped to foster an awareness on the part of non-nuclear powers, of the importance of group cohesion to arms control. This experience has been of particular and perhaps unique

significance to the Western powers. Both during and after the resurgence of cold war attitudes in the early 1980s, these non-nuclear states came to recognize the need for American leadership within the CD. They thus concerted their efforts toward achieving Western cohesion, as a means of engaging the United States more fully in the Geneva exercise. Behind these efforts lay an understanding of the necessary links between the multilateral deliberations and superpower bilateralism, and an understanding of the importance of group cohesion to making this linkage work. The Western non-nuclear powers assumed a lead role at Geneva in attempting to convince the other member states of the critical nature of this complementary relationship. However, this vital task of the non-nuclear states in the CD remains unfinished.

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Non-nuclear Powers and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament

The recently signed Soviet-American INF accord underscores the central role that must be played in the arms control field by the two nuclear superpowers. However, many issues on the current international arms control agenda cannot be effectively resolved by the two superpowers alone. Multilateralism is necessary for the negotiation of arms control accords, yet multilateral arms control diplomacy cannot succeed without Soviet-American leadership and a willingness on their part can provide lesser states with an opportunity to help strengthen superpower interests in arms control. These attributes of multilateral arms control, particularly as they relate to the diplomatic behaviour of non-nuclear states, are examined in this case study of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

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